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Summary
Quality of care is qualified as a main determinant of the demand for voluntary private health
insurance (PHI) in National Health Systems (NHS). This paper provides new evidence on the
influence of the quality gap between public and private health insurance and other demand
determinants in the demand for PHI in Catalonia. The demand for PHI is modelled as a
demand for health care quality. Unlike previous studies, the database employed allows for the
development of a link between the theoretical and the empirical model dealing with
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity issues.  Results suggest that a rise in PHI quality
enhances an equivalent influence in the demand for PHI as an equal reduction of NHS quality.
Income and price elasticity estimates are consistent with the observed feature that  PHI
appears to be a luxury good and individuals tend to be relatively insensible to tax relief's and
monetary co-payments in insurance contracts.
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1. Introduction
The coexistence of public and private health insurance is currently a matter of
extensive discussion among economists and policy makers. Although the National Health
System (NHS) provides universal access to health care, a significant share of the population
choose the alternative of private health care when exists. An explanation for the expansion of
the private health insurance market may lie on public concerns regarding the quality gap
between the NHS and private health care [1]. Accordingly, in order to fund private health care,
some individuals purchase private health insurance (PHI) policies to overcome NHS quality
constraints and access barriers - i.e waiting time and waiting lists for elective surgery-, by
purchasing private health insurance plans [1,2,3].
As far as the NHS typically provides uniform health care, it is conceivable that
difficulties will appear in meeting the expectations of heterogeneous groups' demanding
“personalised” health care [4], greater choice and promptness of delivery. Furthermore, access
barriers may produce public dissatisfaction and reduce perceived quality of potential and
current NHS users. Access barriers in public health systems refer to waiting lists and waiting
time [5], but also bureaucratisation and the need of GP’s referrals to visit specialist doctors.
The expected effect of small quality and access barriers is the reduction of the value of  some
set of the NHS health care competing with the private sector [6] and consequently the
expansion of private alternatives.
Strong equity and efficiency arguments appear behind the role of private health
insurance (PHI). The expansion of private alternatives may also result in some specific
circumstances in a reduction of the public pressures to the health system [7]. It has been
argued that the development of the market for private health enhances beneficial consequences
on the redistributional role of the NHS as pointed out in Besley and Coate (1991) [8]. The
argument establishes that since the rich tend to opt-out to the private insurance alternatives,
those who benefit the most from the NHS are the relatively poor. Hence, public provision of
health care under NHS systems may be an efficient redistributive mechanism because the
delivery of care is still based on a “needs criteria” whereas contributions rely on income.
Nevertheless, those who opt out from the NHS may not be willing to improve the NHS quality4
of care, and hence, the existent gap between the public and private health insurance may tend
to remain.
This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of the demand for voluntary
private health insurance. We focus on two issues that have received less attention in the
literature. First,  the combined influence of both the NHS and PHI perceived health care
quality. We shed some light on the effect of an improvement (reduction) of the publicly
(privately) funded health care quality in the demand for PHI. Second,  to the extent that our
database contains sufficient records on the premium consumers’ pay for PHI and income, price
and also income elasticities are estimated and reported. Third, the link between the theoretical
and the empirical model is explicitly described dealing with unobserved heterogeneity and
endogenenity issues. Forth, empirical results enable a discussion of the expected effects that an
improvement of NHS and private health care quality is likely to enhance in the development of
the PHI market.
Results from this study are specially relevant in the light of the theory of public
provision of private goods [4,9,10]. Since PHI can be a partial substitute of the NHS, public
concerns on the health care quality gap between the NHS and private health care  may foster
the purchase of PHI policies. Quality of care is claimed to be dependent on the funding status
of the NHS. Accordingly, the growth of PHI is partially attributed to pressures limiting  public
health spending that result in a lower quality of publicly funded health care [11,12]. This feature
has motivated a stream of research examining the interactions between the public and private
sector.
A first approach has focused on investigating the existence of captivity in the demand
for PHI. Evidence of this phenomenon would suggest that some people might never purchase
PHI even when its affordable, as far as they are catalogued as captive to the NHS. This may be
reinterpreted as an unwillingness to pay for a hypothetically higher  health care quality if
provided by the private sector.  Propper  (1993) [13] investigated the role of captive
preferences to the British NHS as constraining the specification of the demand for health
insurance. Using a  slightly similar approach it has been shown that some share of the
population may be captive to the private health sector when there is a large tradition of
purchasing PHI and a long-term relationship with private providers [14].5
A second approach focuses on two aspects: the role of waiting lists as a rationing
instrument and political beliefs. Besley et al (1996) [1] found that waiting lists and political
beliefs were associated with a higher demand for PHI. In two further studies Besley et al
provide additional evidence for Britain. Besley et al (1998) [3]  showed  that higher levels of
PHI may affect the length of regional waiting lists.  Besley et al (1999) [2]  found  a significant
effect of long term waiting lists on the decision to purchase PHI. Furthermore, they found that
supporters of the Conservative party were more likely to purchase PHI. Long -term waiting
lists may be seen as an indirect measure of quality of care measure that provides an incentive
to look for alternatives to the NHS. Political beliefs may constrain perceptions on NHS and
PHI quality of care as determine individual attitudes towards both  the public and private
sector. An alternative approach  relies on estimating the effect on individual utility by using
satisfaction measures. Calnan et al (1993) [15] identified satisfaction with the NHS as
influencing the purchase of PHI. NHS satisfaction may be conceived as a measure of individual
utility. If the NHS provides less utility to consumer's respect to PHI alternatives, individuals
may be more inclined to purchase PHI.
Previous Spanish studies based on individual data can be classified according to the
database and the empirical methodology employed. A first source of studies use the Spanish
household survey to estimate the participation and the health care consumption equations
without correcting for the health and health care utilisation effects. Findings show the
influence of socio-economic variables such as income, social class and occupation [16, 17]. A
second source of studies employ the Spanish and Catalan Health Surveys . This has enabled
the use of limited dependent variable models to study of the existence of adverse selection and
moral hazard effects [18], the role of the nature of illness and the existence of captive
preferences  [19], the influence of time spend in waiting time [20]. A different approach was
employed in Vera-Hernández (1999) to study the selection process under duplicate coverage
[21].  Count data models were used to estimate health care  utilisation using generalized
method of moments (GMM) and a reduced form of the PHI demand to correct for
endogeneity. At present neither household nor health surveys contain direct information on6
insurance premia and health care quality. Here we exploit an alternative database that contains
individual data referred to Catalonia and we use a two-stage procedure .
The structure of the paper is as the follows. In section 2 we summarise the main
features characterising the Catalan Health System and the database employed. Section 3
reports a simple theoretical framework and discusses the expected theoretical results. Section
4 provides prior empirical evidence and underlines the empirical model. In section 5 we
explore the estimated results and finally section 6 concludes with a discussion section.7
2.  Health insurance in Catalonia and the data
2.1 The Catalan health system
In Spain, as in most OECD countries the State is major funder of health care. Since
1986, the Spanish NHS offers universal coverage and free of charge health care with the
exception of pharmaceuticals and dental care. The Spanish health system is regionally
decentralised [22]. Catalonia is legally one of the seven Spanish autonomous regions
responsible for health care. Unlike other regions, more than half of Catalan health expenditure
is private (non-profit). Furthermore, the Catalan Health System is a contractual rather than an
integrated based system. Notice that, in this circumstance, the distinction between public and
private health sectors essentially refers to the funding rather than the delivery of health care.
This may have some further implications in the way people perceive quality of care.
PHI has played a historical  role in financing private health care in Catalonia and still
does. From an individual perspective  it may fill the health care gap resulting from the small
flexibility of the NHS to attend individual demands for quality of care. In Spain public servants
can choose an alternative insurance to the NHS coverage, however in Catalonia less than a 5%
of the population are currently in this option. PHI schemes show some similarities with the
Health Maintenance Organisation's (HMO). Typically, benefits are received in kind rather than
reimbursed to the patient. As shown in table 1, 22-23% of the Catalan population purchases
some source of private insurance, a percentage which is far more than in the rest of Spain
(16%). Due explained characteristics, the study of the influence of the quality gap between
private and public insurance in  Catalonia seems to be especially interesting as are health care
related variables the ones that appear as explanatory of the PHI demand [21].
PHI in Spain provides coverage against the event of private medical treatment. It is
mainly individually rather than corporately purchased. Even though there a large set of
motives explaining PHI demand, well known reasons are the avoidance of waiting lists [1,2]
and waiting time [7] and the provision of individualised medical care [2]. Other motives are
health care choice improvement and health information [11]. Regarding the source of health
care offered, PHI essentially supplies elective care rather than urgent procedures.8
Insert table 1 here
2.2 The nature of the data
At present no public  survey contains direct information on the quality assessment of
public and private health care. Therefore, a specific survey was conducted to obtain
information on insurance premia and individual perceptions of quality. Data was taken from a
specifically designed computer based survey. This survey was approached by a specialised firm
on market and opinion research between June and July 1999. Although the sample is relatively
small (N=400), it is representative of provinces and relies on households rather than
individuals. Respondents were identified and asked questions related to holding private health
insurance, quality aspects of health insurance and socio-economic characteristics. The two
most relevant records that  base our study are perceived quality assessment of both the NHS
and the PHI and the declared insurance premium each head of the household pays for itself
and their relatives. The questionnaire contains records on health status and disability, health
care utilisation as well as attitudes towards private health insurance. The quality of this
information appears to be far enough for our purposes as no missing data problems were
encountered
1.
                                               
1 There are no large differences with other comparable estimates obtained from the Catalan health survey and
other published statistical data. For instance, those having a PHI were a 22.7% according to the Catalan Health
Survey 1994 estimates and in our sample they represent a 23% in 1999.9
3. The theoretical framework
The decision to purchase a PHI policy may be seen as of a discrete nature. As far as
PHI provides elective health care at a higher quality than the NHS, it’s natural to assume that
individuals would not simultaneously consume the same health care at the NHS and the private
sector [11]. Individuals demand a good in the private sector that is supplied at a hypothetically
lower quality by the NHS sector but at no monetary cost. Even though  some authors argue
there is an intangible co-payment in the NHS health care utilisation [21] here we  integrate
access barriers within the concept of perceived health care quality. Since preferences for health
care quality may differ across individuals, not all individuals that  can afford PHI will actually
purchase it. This latter evidence was shown by Johanesson et al (1998) [23] employing an
insurance approach to estimate the decision to switch into the private sector to reduce waiting
lists. If this is the case, using either the length of waiting lists or any other indirect quality
variable as a quality of care measure may incompletely capture preferences for health care
quality. In this study, the reference variable to base our approach is a direct measure of
perceived health care quality.
Health care quality is catalogued as a measurable variable ranging from  [ ] 1 Q Q max, ˛ .
Obviously, the value of  max Q  depends on the scale employed. As noticed before it may capture
the broad dimensionality of health care quality. NHS quality  ) (
0 Q its assumed to be dependent
on some noticeable characteristics that steams from the “uniformity” of health care,  namely
large waiting lists and waiting times, less flexibility to cope with individual specific needs and
less attention to “non-clinical” health care outcomes. Alternatively, PHI provides a more
“individualised” care, waiting lists are infrequent and in general, benefits  associated with the
delivery of care tend to be higher. There is no need to assume that clinical quality differs
between the public and private sector.  As privately insured individuals have duplicate
coverage, they enjoy the same health care quality as the rest, but as they can avoid the
uniformity of NHS health care and access barriers in competing health care barriers, they enjoy
of a higher health care quality. If 
1 Q represents the quality of private health care, it's natural to
state that 
0 1 Q Q ‡ .10
Quality of care is assumed to be an argument of  the individual utility function altering
the valuation of health care.  Health care  ) (M  may be seen as a composite commodity of a
basic health care  ) ( 0 M  that is assumed not to differ between the public and the private
alternative, a quality adjustment term  ) (
i Q  and an private health care costs (p)  as (1) shows
where  0 , 1 = i  refers to the private and public alternative respectively:




Under these circumstances, if there is a private alternative to the NHS the main
decision variable is health care quality and expected medical costs. Lets assume for simplicity
that PHI companies charge an actuarial fair insurance premium  ) (p  such that  h = p p  where
p  refers to health care costs and h  refers to the probability of illness. This means that if  1 < h
then always  p < p . That is, it is always preferable to consume private health care under an
insurance scheme rather than out of pocket if the probability of illness is less than one.
Individuals show two alternative options: not purchasing PHI which means under these
assumptions consuming health care at a fixed quality 
0 Q  not paying additional charges
) 0 , (
o Q , or purchasing PHI, which implies a higher quality of care but simultaneously a
reduction in net income by the amount of the insurance premium  ) , ( p
1 Q .
As a given assumption, individuals are assumed to be risk averse and expected utility
maximizers. Therefore, utility functions are concave and increasing in its arguments. Individual
utility determinants can be summarised in two main arguments: quality of care and income.
Thus, the decision to purchase PHI will be determined by the utility gain derived from a rise in
health care quality  and the disutility that arises from a reduction in income as a result of
paying an insurance premium. Therefore, the decision to purchase PHI will result if
) , , ( ) , , (
1 0 h h p y Q U y Q U - < .
This result may be generalised within an expected utility framework. Individuals are
assumed to behave as expected utility maximizers. That is, they max11
[ ] ) , ( ), , ( max ) ), ( , , ( 0 1 1 0 y Q V y Q V y Q Q V p h p - = . If an individual purchases a PHI its
expected utility V(·) is :
                      ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) , , , (
1 1 1 1
1 Q p y U 1 Q p y Q U p y Q V h - h - + h - h = h
(2)
and if  individual decides not to purchase PHI, then the expected utility is :
                                    ) ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) , , (
0 0
0 y U y Q U p y Q V h h h - + =
(3)
Therefore, the purchase of PHI implies that the expected utility gain  ) (VG form the
purchasing PHI is positive , i.e







Equation 4 illustrates the key variables influencing the demand for PHI. Relevant
variables are: insurance premium  ) (p , income (y), quality perceptions of both private heath
care  ) (
1 Q  and NHS health care  ) (
0 Q , and the probability of illness  ) (h . Finally, and
additional relevant variable is risk aversion as influences the concavity of individual utility
functions, and thus the expected utility gain. As the demand for PHI is expected to show a
negative slope, insurance premium should show a negative effect in the insurance decision.
Following Besley et al (1999) [2] the role of income is as follows: If quality of care is a normal





, then there is a threshold income  
* y  determining the purchase of private health
insurance. Therefore, we should expect a positive influence of income in the demand for PHI
quality. Quality of private and NHS health care should show opposite effects. Whereas a rise
in the perceived quality of NHS health care should reduce the probability of purchasing PHI, a
rise in private health care quality should increase in the probability of insurance. Therefore, the
quality gap between the NHS and private health care could appear as the explanatory variable12
of the PHI demand. Accordingly, in that case there is no relevant difference in the PHI demand
between increasing the quality of care or decreasing the PHI quality of care. The probability of
illness is expected to show an ambiguous effect. Even though individuals with a larger
probability of illness are more likely to demand PHI, increases in insurance premiums as a
result of a larger probability of illness show the opposite effect. Finally, a greater risk aversion
will increase the expected utility of purchasing health insurance.13
4. The empirical model
This section explicitly describes the empirical model and a detailed description of the
variables used in the analysis.
4.1 The empirical specification
According to the theoretical model discussed in the previous section, the empirical
specification will be based in the following model.
           
￿
￿
￿ ‡ h - h p =
=
otherwise        0
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where I  equals  one when the individual purchases PHI. We assume that the expected
utility gain depends heavily on the relevant variables, allowing also for observed (X) and
unobserved heterogeneity (e) to influence it.  Under these assumptions equation (5) becomes:
￿
￿
￿ > e + h b + b + b + b + p b + b
=
otherwise        0
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where  i e  is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance, i.e
we assume a probit specification. In the vector X we include risk aversion, variables which aim
to control for a geographic effect and also the degree of health care utilisation (M). On the
other hand, as we do not observe the probability of illness, we include variables which proxy
them (age, self-reported health status and existence of disability) as noted before.
Additionally, given the characteristics of the data and the variables employed, the
premium and the quality perception of PHI are not observable for those individuals not having
PHI. In order to correct this sample selection problem and also the possible endogeneity of
those variables, we estimate reduced form equations for these variables, including a correction14
term to control for sample selection [24] . Additionally, we use these estimated equations to
make unconditional predictions for both the premium
2 and the quality perception of PHI for all
these individuals, to be used as instruments  for the original variables in a kind of two-stage
least squares procedure
3 [25].   
Given the form in which the private insurance premium is fixed in Spain, we include as
regressors in the premium reduced form equation the following variables: age, members of the
household unit covered by PHI, family income and health status proxied by the existence of
disability and (self-reported) health status of the head of the household.   On the other hand, in
the reduced form equation for quality perception of PHI we include as regressors: age,
education and (self-reported) health status of the head of the household.
4.2 Variables
a) Health care quality ( 1 0 Q Q , )
Quality variables tend to show a large dimensionality sometimes difficult to identify.
Ideally, indicators of health care quality should rely on measures of treatment performance.
Following Li and Benton (1996) we may distinguish between internal and external quality
measures [26]. The latter refers to individual quality perceptions and satisfaction measures,
whereas the first ones  capture the adequacy of health care supplied to the specific patient.
Due to the complexity of accounting for treatment performance, we didn't find any accepted
internal quality indicator applicable to this study. Previous studies rely on indirect measures of
internal quality [6,7].  Indirect quality measures are based on some specific dimensions of
health care. Examples of these are (long –term) waiting lists or waiting time measures
[2,3,7,19]. However, these sort of kinds of indicators are restricted to the measurement of the
promptness of health care delivery as a rationing instrument. The association between the
length of waiting lists and the demand for health insurance may be indicative of the stylised
                                               










ˆ ln exp ˆ  .
3 This type of approach is similar to that used in the estimation of labour supply equations when trying to solve
the unobservability of wages for those who do not work and its possible endogeneity.15
fact that improving access to the NHS reduces the demand for PHI.  Moreover, internal
quality indicators do not account for differences in the valuation of quality across individuals.
In this study we employ a measure of external quality of care based on consumer
perceptions. It refers to the perceived quality elicited from a global individual judgement
among private and NHS health care without distinguishing between different quality
dimensions.  We employ a specific ascending scale measure, ranging from 10 (excellent) to 1
(very bad). For comparative reasons, our  purpose is to obtain a global and homogenous
measure of perceived quality of care. We assume that all individuals are able to assess a value
to the quality they perceive from NHS health care and private health insured individuals are
able to assess a value to private health care. As hypothesised in section 3, we expect this
variable to show a significant effect in the demand equation. The higher the NHS quality
perceived by the individual, the less likely she will purchase PHI. Consequently, the quality of
private health care should show an opposite pattern. The higher the quality perceived from
private health care the more likely the purchase of PHI.
The determinants we used to instrument health care quality are age, education and
health. Accordingly, we measure the influence of age using four dummy variables (see data
Appendix). A first dummy variable (Age 1) captures young age until the age people tend to
have children around 30. A second dummy variable (Age 2) includes the age ranging from 30
to 44 where people tend to have children. A third dummy (Age 3) includes age from 45-64
refers to an age range where some acute diseases appear more intensively, and finally a fourth
dummy variable (Age 4) captures individuals older than 64 where health utilisation tends to be
more intense and chronic diseases appear more intensively. We include education  by defining
a set of five dummy variables (Education 1-5) according to educational success, ranging from
primary studies to university studies. Finally, health status has been measured by a qualitative
self-reported health status variable where 1 equals bad perceived health and 5 equals excellent
perceived  health. Age and health status tend to be associated with health utilisation [27],
therefore we expect them to be respectively negatively and positively associated with the
perception of quality. The older the individual the more likely to have some previous
experience with medical treatment and thus to identify “failures” in the provision of health
care. Education may be associated with medical information and knowledge  [28]. Hence,16
better informed consumers should be more likely to perceive the benefits and costs of
purchasing private health insurance to improve their health care choice.
b) Insurance premium (p)
 Since  PHI premiums extensively differ from one insurer to another, no standardised
insurance premium information was available. Therefore, we measure the effects of the
insurance premium as the declared insurance premium for every household member covered
(see data appendix). However, we only observe insurance premia for those individuals that
have purchased PHI.  As noted before, we expect the premium to show a negative effect on
the demand for PHI. We hypothesise that insurers will charge different premia according to
those identifiable factors that influence the probability of illness and health care utilisation.
Premia are expected to vary with age, health status, and existence of any disability and
household size. Age is important because it is a common practice for insurance companies to
charge different premiums according to age and to request information on health status and
the existence of any disability. Thus, insurance premium is expected to rise with age showing a
negative influence as included in the premium equation Furthermore, we include the effect of
income to capture possible differences in the coverage level of PHI policies. Richer individuals
may be willing to pay more for a larger coverage than poorer individuals.
c) Income (y)
 
 As noted in previous studies and in the theoretical model, income is catalogued as an
influential variable. The demand for PHI  should differs across the income distribution. The
higher the income the more likely individuals would purchase private health insurance. Income
is measured as a net monthly income as we think individuals might show fewer difficulties in
eliciting their monthly income than their annual income.
 
d) Probability of illness (h)
 17
 Given that the probability of illness is not observable, we proxy that variable using
illness measures and age. Illness has been measured using two different variables. First we
include a standard measure of general health status, the self reported health status (perceived
health). Furthermore, the second measure indicates the existence of any disability (Disability).
Both are expected to show a negative impact in the decision to purchase a PHI, as they would
be associated with higher medical expenses. We assume that if health status is relatively
unobservable by insurers, those expecting to be in good health have little to gain from
insurance. However, available data refers to current rather than expected health status.
Previous studies identify some difficulties with this interpretation   [29] as far as  health status
may be associated with income. However, Propper (1993) [12] found no clear relationship
between health status and latent demand. As noted previously, we also include age which is a
variable reflecting the deterioration of health status, therefore we may expect a positive sign of
the age coefficient in the demand equation. As its shown in figure 1, being in a young and
healthy age category that is associated with having children is expected to display a positive
influence in the demand equation.
 
e) Other variables (X)
Expected medical consumption  ) (M
In the theoretical model, expected health expenditure may determine the benefits
obtained from PHI respect of consuming private health care out of pocket. An additional
reason explaining the influence of expected medical consumption is that part of the value of
PHI may be attributed to additional medical expenses insured will consume with PHI. We
depict the influence of expected medical consumption by assuming that current consumption
will approximate expected consumption. Thus,  variables included were the number of visits to
the general practitioner (GP visits) and outpatient visits (Specialist visits) in the last three
months. A higher medical consumption of those privately insured may be understood as an
evidence of moral hazard [12]. That is, as individuals show less access barriers when privately
insured they tend to consume more. Particularly, this may be the case of outpatient visits, as
under PHI schemes there is no need for a referral from the GP. However, this is not the case18
of  GP visits as the number of visits to the NHS GP may be influenced by the need to obtain
subsidized prescribed medicines [21].
Attitudes towards risk
 One of the economic purposes of health insurance is to reduce financial uncertainty as
a result of illness. Therefore, the higher risk aversion individual face, the more likely she will
purchase health insurance. Manning and Marquis (1996) [27] directly estimated the revealed
risk aversion parameter using experimental data on insurance preferences over full coverage
and catastrophic limit insurance.  Propper (1993) [12] measured attitudes towards risk by
means of a dummy variable asking the respondent to report whether an individual would
consider paying for private health insurance at the point of demand. Unlike former Spanish
studies we include a variable of attitudes towards risk. To this extent we use a qualitative scale
variable ranging from 1 (extremely risk averse) to 10 (risk lover).
Geographical differences
The structure of the Catalan health system show sensible differences in the availability
of privately provided health care across capitals of provinces and other villages. Those living
in a capital may benefit the most from purchasing PHI. Therefore, we may expect the variable
Capital, (see data Appendix) to show a positive coefficient.19
5. Results
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics of those variables used classified according
to having purchased PHI. In particular, we observe sensible income differences between the
two groups. This may be interpreted as a preliminary evidence that PHI is a normal good given
that the average income is higher among the insured.  Looking at household characteristics
(see Table 2) we find that the privately insured tend to be highly educated, risk averse and
relatively well off. Moreover, figure 1 indicates that age places a relevant role in determining
PHI purchase. Perceived health and GP visits do not appear to significantly differ between the
two groups. Looking at outpatient visits, we find that privately insured seem to visit specialists
nearly twice as much as the uninsured.
Insert table 2 here
Estimation results are shown in table 3. The first column shows the results from the
reduced form of the insurance demand equation. The second column refers to the perceived
quality equation of PHI and the third column refers to the premium equation. Finally, the
estimation result of the structural equation for the PHI purchase decision as specified in
equation (6) is presented in the forth column.
Insert table 3 and 4 here
A first overview of the results suggests that many of the observed effects obtained by
examining raw statistics are confirmed in the demand equation. Looking at the reduced form
estimates of the demand for health insurance (in the first column) we find that  raises with
income, age, some sources of health care utilisation and education.
The structural form (fourth column of table 3) shows the main findings. It's shown the
combined influence of perceived quality of both the NHS and PHI health care in the demand20
for PHI. The coefficients are negative and positive respectively as predicted, and appear to be
significant and robust. Moreover, both coefficients are very similar in absolute values.  Results
confirm the hypothesis that widening the gap between the public and privately financed health
care increases the probability of purchasing a PHI policy. Therefore, rising the quality of NHS
health care enhances a similar effect on the PHI demand as a reduction in quality of the PHI in
the same magnitude. This confirms the previous theoretical intuition and  fits in the structure
of a conditional discrete choice model where those variables which differ not only across
individuals but also across alternatives have the same coefficient, meaning that what matters in
terms of the decision is the difference of values of these variables between alternatives.
The influence of the  insurance premium shows a correctly signed coefficient. Table 4
shows an average absolute price elasticity estimate of 0.429. Analysing how price elasticity
differs with age, location and NHS quality perceptions we find significant differences for older
individuals and those living in a provincial capital. Price elasticity rises with age until an age of
60 years old that starts reducing. People living in non-urban areas and those that perceive a
high quality form the NHS care show higher price elasticities. The significance of age may be
explained because quality of care starts being more valued once consumers have more
experience with health care and realize they future medical expenses. Moreover, as insurers
tend to exclude elderly or alternatively  rise insurance premia according to age, this effect
should result in lower price elasticity. The geographical effect shows that as people living in
the capital, are more sensitive to small changes in benefits and costs of purchasing PHI that
people living outside, as access and availability of private health care is higher in provincial
capitals . As predicted, NHS quality is to increase price elasticity because those individuals
that perceive a higher quality from the NHS are more sensible to differences in prices.
 As predicted, net income appears to display strong, robust and significant effects.
Following Besley et al  (1999) [2], the individual position in the income distribution shows a
strong influence in the demand for PHI. Table 4 shows that income elasticity’s decrease with
age, indicating that demand is sensibly correlated with the life cycle. The younger the
individual the less likely is to suffer from illness and the more luxurious is PHI. Income
elasticites are lower if individuals live in the provincial capital as there is a larger availability
and variety of private health care providers.21
 Variables that proxy health status display the correct sign, but they are not significant.
A poorer health status is not associated with a higher probability of purchasing PHI. This may
be interpreted  as an evidence to reject the existence of adverse selection. However this result
should be interpreted cautiously . On the one hand, the effect of health will be partially
captured mainly by age variables. On the other hand, we have used a proxy variable for
expected future health status rather that a direct measure of revealed  expected  health status.
Regarding health care utilisation, outpatient visits appear to be significant but not GP visits.
The significance of the outpatient visits can be seen as a particular case where private health
insurance may improve access to health care - avoiding outpatient waiting lists - by purchasing
PHI, as there is no need for GP referrals. However, this variable is sensible to the role of
education as a higher health information may induce patients to decide for themselves the sort
of health professional they are looking for [28]. The non significance of GP visits may be
explained by two features. First, access barriers in visiting the GP are very small or even
inexistent. Second, NHS GP visits are sometimes motivated by the need of   obtaining a
subsidised prescription. The geographical variable (capital) show a strong significant effect. In
particular the variable capital is positively associated with the demand for PHI reflecting the
fact that the availability of private health care is greater in the regional capital.   Finally,
attitudes towards risk are significant  displaying a negative sign. The meaning of this result is
that the more risk averse  the individual  is (small values in the risk attitude variable) the more
likely she is to purchase a PHI policy.
Second column of table 3 shows that quality of care is associated with age and
education. As far as the young individuals use less the NHS, there are less sensitive to quality
variations compared to old individuals. Moreover, the more educated the individuals are, the
higher the value of NHS quality. This may be explained by possible interactions with income
as well as by the fact that perceived quality is the result of a higher health care knowledge  and
health information, typically associated with education [28].
The third column of table 4 shows that household size and age are significant
predictors of the insurance premiums. Since a large household size increases the expected
health care consumption the determinants of insurance premiums may have picked up this
upward effect. Age, as already explained, influences the degree of health care utilisation. Thus,
higher insurance premia are set to older individuals.  An additional variable included is income.22
The reason is that premiums reflect differences in the PHI coverage that are supposed to be
influenced by income. Since income shows a positive and significant effect this hypothesis may
be confirmed.
Age shows two opposite effects. First, the older the individual is, the less likely she is
to be healthy, what in turn increases the likelihood of purchasing a PHI policy (illness effect).
The second effect reflects the common practice of insurers to attach higher premiums to older
individuals (premium effect). Hence, the effect of age in the reduced form captures the net
effect of these two variables. As estimates form table 3 show that PHI demand rises with age,
this may be interpreted as an evidence of the dominance of the  “illness effect” over the
premium effect.  The hidden dummy variable is Age 4, referring to those individuals older than
60. This result is consistent with other Spanish studies [15].
From the reduced form we find that those variables that appear to be significant in the
structural equation remain significant and show similar effects. Demand for PHI is positively
associated with education. This may be the result of the latent variables that explain the quality
of care perceptions. A positive parameter was observed as well by other previous studies
based on larger samples [15,16,17].  However, notice that education shows a significant effect
in the quality perception and as expected  is negatively associated with the purchase of PHI.
Those individuals with lower education attainment are less able to perceive the quality gap
between public and private health insurance. Household size has a negative sign but does not
appear to show any significant effects when included in the reduced form.23
6. Discussion
In this paper we have investigated the role of quality of care in determining the demand
for PHI. Former studies investigate equilibrium systems with PHI showing two stylised facts.
First, the opting out of the public sector is the result of a lack of quality and flexibility of the
publicly financed care [7,8,9].  Second, the effect of the expansion of the NHS care may crowd
out the private sector [30]. However this would depend on the capacity of the private sector to
adjust  their quality to maintain PHI demand . We find that if the NHS increases perceived
quality in a 10% this would be equivalent to a reduction of a 10% in the PHI quality. This
study integrates this two issues from an individually based perspective. Another novelty that
this paper introduces is the estimation of price elasticities for Spanish data.   The relevance of
price elasticity estimates relies on the information that includes on the impact of cost sharing
policies. Demand elasticities show that PHI appears to be quite insensitive to premium
variations. The interpretation following Manning and Marquis (1996) [27] is that the larger the
price elasticity ceteris paribus, the greater the welfare loss resulting from more generous
health insurance. Consistently with previous evidence quality of care is a normal good and
income elasticity are higher than one, suggesting that PHI is a luxury good, which is consistent
as well with some previous studies based on aggregate demand analysis [17].
Results suggest that PHI demand is very sensitive to health care quality perceptions.
The Catalan NHS strongly suffers from quality limitations, steaming from the long waiting lists
in some procedures (i.e elective surgery) and other access limitations. This is consistent with
recent literature on the impact of waiting lists and waiting time in the demand elective surgery
in Britian [1,31,32]. In particular,  Gravelle et al (2001) [32] show that performance measures
have a large influence in patient's demand for health care. Current health policy debate
pretends to encounter optimal instruments to promote quality and efficiency using private
substitutes of publicly financed goods. A previous tax relief on PHI purchases has been
recently removed in Spain from 1999. The low price elasticity estimated here confirm that
subsidising health care consumption would have a small effect on demand whereas improving
NHS quality may effectively show an impact on the demand for PHI.24
Limitations of this study are the following. First, the database employed is small even
though data was representative and no missing data problems were found. In Catalonia, such
as in those countries where the purchase of PHI is linked to social and familiar tradition, there
may be alternative explanations to the ones that are provide by standard insurance theory.
Trust with physicians, information asymmetries and information costs may refrain individuals
to switch from one insurer to another. This may require the use of panel data analysis in order
to capture time effects as well as individual effects [33]. Propper (2000) [34] shows examining
the British Household Panel Survey that use of private (NHS) health care is explained by past
used of private (NHS) health care, what may suggests a that other  determinants as PHI
purchasing tradition may be strongly relevant even when estimating the determinants of PHI.
Other studies employing proxies for quality of care variables have already shown a negative
impact on the demand for health insurance. In particular,  Jofre (1998) [19] argued that
assuming the quality of private health care as fixed, the effects of increasing the quality of the
NHS are to trigger the substitution between the public and private health care. However,
dismissing the effects that  PHI quality may have on the demand for PHI is a strong
assumption. In this study, quality of private health care was not assumed to be fixed as
information on PHI quality was available. As private health care may show a larger flexibility
to new circumstances compared to the NHS, it seems necessary to include the influence of
PHI quality perceptions to completely account for the determinants of PHI demand.  Our
results show that NHS and private health care if allowed to interact, show an equivalent and
opposite effect in the demand for health insurance.25
Table 1.







Source: Anuari Estadísitic de Catalunya, 1999.26
Table 2.
Characteristics of privately (un) insured
(Descriptive statistics)
Insured Uninsured
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Age 53.7 16.92 53.8 17.1
Net Income
(thousand PTAs)
225,2 107,8 185,6 87,8
Household size 2.68 1.13 2.68 1.25
Education 1 0.41 0.49 0.64 0.47
Education 2 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32
Education 3 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26
Education 4 0.68 0.25 0.03 0.19
Education 5 0.27 0.44 0.11 0.32
Disability 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.38
Risk Attitudes 2.72 1.72 2.94 1.67
Capital 0.59 0.49 0.33 0.47
Specialist visits 0.82 2.61 0.47 1.3
GP visits 0.42 0.88 0.60 1.18
Perceived Health 3.64 0.96 3.44 1.10
NHS care (quality) 5.35 3.25 7.07 2.54
N 87 31327
Table 3.
 Maximum Likelihood results.
Variable Insurance (*)                  PHI Quality                   Premium
                   (log)











































































































0.188 0.19 0.46 0.171
N 400 87 87 400
Note: t-value in the parenthesis.
(*) Reduced form of the model.
(**) Refers to the linear prediction, measured in millions of PTA's
(***) Measured in millions of PTA's.28
Table 4. Elasticity estimates for PHI
p E y E
All sample 0.429 1.962
Age 1 (less than 30) 0.438 2.751
Age 2 (30-44) 0.439 2.403
Age 3  (45-64) 0.497 2.094
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DATA APENDIX
Summary of variables employed




Dummy Respondent has purchased a PHI policy .23
(.44)








Premium (head of the
family)
Numerical Premium paid 7117
(3216)
Premium  (Children) Numerical Premium paid 6285
(1726)
Premium (Other) Numerical Premium paid 5567
(2082)
Age Numerical Respondent Age 53.9
(17.0)
Age1 Dummy Less than 30 0.12
(0.32)
Age 2 Dummy Between 30 and 44 0.25
(0.43)
Age 3 Dummy Between 45 and 59 0.27
(0.44)




Numerical Individually declared monthly average




Household size Numerical Number of members of the household 2.67
(1.22)
Education 1 Dummy Respondent has a primary school degree 0.59
(0.49)
Education 2 Dummy Respondent has a secondary school degree 0.13
(0.33)




Education 4 Dummy Respondent has a medium university degree 0.04
(0.20)
Education 5 Dummy Respondent has a superior university degree 0.15
(0.35)
Disability Dummy Respondent has a chronic condition 0.17
(0.38)
Risk Attitudes Qualitative Respondent risk attitudes ranging from is risk
aversion =1 to risk seeking=10
2.89
(1.68)








GP visits Numerical Number of GP visits in the last 3 months 0.56
(1.12)
Perceived Health Qualitative Respondent assessment of its health status
from Bad=1 for excellent=5
3.48
(1.05)33